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important novelty of the experimental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows
us to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects’ decisions for all realizations of their
private signal. In the paper, we compare two treatments: one in which the price adjusts to the
orderﬂowinsuchawaythatherdingshouldneveroccur,andoneinwhichthepresenceofevent
uncertainty makes herding possible. In the ﬁrst treatment, subjects seldom herd, in accordance
with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of
subjects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the
second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as the theory
would suggest. Moreover, contrarianism disappears altogether. In both treatments, in contrast
with what theory predicts, subjects sometimes prefer to abstain from trading, which affects the




an interest stems from the effects that herding may have both on ﬁnancial mar-
kets’ stability and on the markets’ ability to achieve allocative and informational
efﬁciency.
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Thetheoreticalliteraturehastriedtoidentifythemechanismsthatleadtraders
to herd (for surveys, see, e.g., Gale 1996; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Chamley
2004; Vives 2008). The theoretical contributions have emphasized that, in ﬁnan-
cialmarkets,thefactthatpricesadjusttotheorderﬂowmakesitmoredifﬁcultfor
herding to arise than in other setups, such as those studied in the social learning
literature, where there is no price mechanism. Nevertheless, it is possible that
rational traders herd, because there are different sources of uncertainty in the
market, for example.
To test herding models directly with data from actual ﬁnancial markets is
difﬁcult. In order to test for herd behavior one needs to detect whether agents
choose the same action independently of their private information.1 The problem
for the empiricist is that there are no data on the private information available to
the traders. As a result, it is difﬁcult to determine whether traders make similar
decisions because they disregard their own information and imitate other traders,
orbecausetheyarereactingtothesamepieceofpublicinformation,forinstance.2
To overcome this problem, some authors (Cipriani and Guarino 2005a;
Drehmann, Oechssler, and Rider 2005) have tested herd behavior in a labora-
tory ﬁnancial market. In the laboratory, participants receive private information
on the value of a security and observe the decisions of other subjects. Given these
two pieces of information, they choose sequentially if they want to sell, buy, or
not trade a security with a market maker. In the laboratory one can observe the
privateinformationthatsubjectshavewhenmakingtheirdecisions,andtherefore
it is possible to test models of herding directly.
Ourpapercontributestotheexistingexperimentalliteratureonherdbehavior
in ﬁnancial markets by innovating in three signiﬁcant aspects.
First, our sample consists of ﬁnancial market professionals. The existing
experimentalstudiesonherdinginﬁnancialmarketsusecollegeundergraduatesas
subjects. As a result, one may wonder how representative these laboratory exper-
iments are of the behavior of professionals operating in actual ﬁnancial markets.
The external validity of experimental studies is, indeed, a well-known concern in
the literature. In our speciﬁc case, one may imagine that professional behavior
in the ﬁeld might differ from students’ behavior in the laboratory because of age
difference and different levels of education or training. Moreover, professional
1. Here we only discuss herding informally. In the next section we will give a formal deﬁnition.
2. The existing empirical literature on herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1995; Wermers 1999; Sias 2004) does
notattempttoidentifyinformationalherdingasisusuallydeﬁnedinthetheoreticalandexperimental
literature. These empirical studies present a statistical analysis that measures the extent of decision
clustering by ﬁnancial market participants (e.g., fund managers), independently of the underlying
reasonsforsuchclustering(see,e.g.,thecommentsinBikhchandaniandSharma2001).Anexception
is a recent paper by Cipriani and Guarino (2006) that estimates a structural model of informational
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expertise,developedbyworkingdailyinﬁnancialmarkets,mayleadtothedevel-
opment of trading heuristics that are different from those used by non-ﬁnancial
professionals.
Second, the existing literature has tested for the presence of herding in a
market where, according to the theory, herding should never arise. In contrast,
we compare two treatments: one (Treatment I) in which, as in the previous exper-
imental work, subjects should always use their private information and never
herd; the other (Treatment II) where, instead, herding becomes optimal because
of event uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the presence of informed traders in
the market. The economy studied in Treatment II has never been analyzed exper-
imentally (not even with a more standard pool of participants), although event
uncertainty is recognized in the theoretical literature as one of the main channels
of herding in ﬁnancial markets (Avery and Zemsky 1998).
Third, we ran the experiment using a strategy method–like procedure that
allowed us to detect herding behavior directly (whereas in previous work it could
only be inferred indirectly). In particular, in previous experimental work subjects
wereaskedtotradeinsequence,onebyone.Eachsubjectreceivedaprivatesignal
andthenmadeadecision.Incontrast,inourexperiment,allsubjectswhohavenot
yet traded make their decisions conditional on all signal realizations. Only after
all subjects have chosen their strategies is one subject randomly chosen to trade
and his strategy implemented for the realized signal value. This is a signiﬁcant
procedural novelty in the experimental literature on herding and informational
cascades: Because each subject makes a decision for each signal realization, we
canobservedirectlywhetherandwhenhechoosesthesameactionirrespectiveof
his private information. Moreover, because in each period of trading all subjects
who have not yet traded are asked to make a decision for each signal, our data
set is much larger than it would have been in the earlier experimental designs.
This was particularly important given the difﬁculty of recruiting ﬁnancial-market
professionals in large numbers.
Theresultsofourexperimentshowthat,astheorysuggests,theproportionof
herdingdecisionsisverylowinTreatmentI.Therefore,thetheoreticalprediction
that price adjustment to the order ﬂow reduces the scope for herding behavior is
conﬁrmed by the experimental data on ﬁnancial market professionals. Moreover,
also in accordance with the theory, herding increases in Treatment II, where the
price adjustment rule is consistent with the presence of event uncertainty. Never-
theless, some important anomalies do occur in the laboratory. First, in Treatment
I, some subjects engage in contrarianism, something not predicted by the theory.
These subjects go against the market, selling (regardless of the private signal)
when the price is high, and buying (regardless of the private signal) when it is
low. Second, in Treatment II, herd behavior is lower than theory predicts. Third,
in both treatments, subjects have a tendency to abstain from trading, which is not
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to infer the subjects’ private signals, which lowers the informational efﬁciency of
the market.
ItisworthnotingthatourresultsinTreatmentIaresimilartothoseobtainedby
previous experimental work using student subjects. In both samples, the propor-
tion of herding is low, as the theory predicts. Moreover, subjects in both samples
share the propensity to act as contrarians and to abstain from trading more than
is predicted by the theory. This reassures the reader of the validity of previous
experimental work that relies on student subjects.
Beforemovingtothemainanalysis,wenowprovideabriefliteraturereview.
Literaturereview. Ourpaperisrelatedtothetheoreticalliteratureonherdbehav-
ior in ﬁnancial markets. In particular, our experimental setup is based on the
analysis of Avery and Zemsky (1998). They show that, in a sequential trading
model such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), where the price is correctly set by a
market maker according to the order ﬂow, traders never herd. Herding, however,
arisesifthereisuncertaintynotonlyregardingthefundamentalvalueoftheasset,
but also regarding other characteristics of the market, such as the proportion of
informed traders in the market (event uncertainty). Park and Sabourian (2006)
have recently revisited Avery and Zemsky’s model and provided different condi-
tions on the signal structure under which herd behavior can arise. Other scholars
have shown that informational cascades and herding in ﬁnancial markets occur
when traders have informational and non-informational (e.g., liquidity or hedg-
ing) motives to trade (Cipriani and Guarino 2008a), or when trading activity is
affected by reputation concerns (Dasgupta and Prat, forthcoming).
Our work belongs to the experimental literature on herding in ﬁnancial mar-
kets.WehavealreadymentionedthatCiprianiandGuarino(2005a)andDrehmann
et al. (2005) have tested for herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets using student sub-
jects.3 One of the purposes of our paper is to compare the behavior of ﬁnancial
market professionals with that of students. In Section 5, we will discuss in detail
howourresultscomparewiththoseofthesepapers.CiprianiandGuarino(2008b)
have shown that informational cascades form in a laboratory ﬁnancial market in
the presence of transaction costs. Because there are no transaction costs in the
experiment described here, this type of cascade cannot arise.
Finally, our paper is also close in spirit to Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007).
Like us, they use ﬁnancial professionals in their experimental study. In contrast
to our study, however, they test a standard informational cascade game based
3. Note that Drehmann et al. (2005) study herding behavior in an experimental ﬁnancial market
using a sample of both students and consultants. They use consultants as a control group, focusing
on their level of rationality, which they ﬁnd similar to that of student subjects; they do not present
any result on the propensity of consultants to herd or act as contrarian. Consultants in their sample
are not ﬁnancial market professionals and therefore their behavior may differ from that of ﬁnancial
market actors because of differences in training, experience, and expertise.210 Journal of the European Economic Association
on Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and not a model of trading in
ﬁnancial markets.4 They ﬁnd that market professionals rely on their private infor-
mation to a greater extent than student subjects do; as a result, fewer cascades
(and especially fewer cascades on the wrong action) form in the laboratory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the the-
oretical model and its predictions. Section 3 presents the experimental design.
Section 4 illustrates the main results. Section 5 compares them with the results
in the existing experimental literature. Section 6 discusses individual behavior.
Section 7 concludes.
2. The Theoretical Model
2.1. The Model Structure
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our experimental analysis is based on the
theoretical model of Avery and Zemsky (1998), who analyze herd behavior in an
economy similar to that of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara
(1987). In contrast to these papers, however, we assume that the market maker
can post only one price, that is, he is not allowed to post different prices at which
traders can buy (the ask price) or sell (the bid price). We adopt this assumption
to simplify the implementation of the trading game in the laboratory. All the
results that we present in this theoretical section hold independently of whether
the market maker is allowed to post a bid and an ask price.
In our market there is one asset traded by a sequence of traders who interact
with a market maker. Time is represented by a countable set of trading periods,
indexed by t ∈ 1,2,.... Traders act in an exogenously determined sequential
order. Each trader, indexed by t, is chosen to take an action only once, at time t.
Theassetvalue. Thefundamentalvalueoftheassetisadiscreterandomvariable
v. An information event occurs with probability p;5 in this case, the asset value
takes the values 0 and 100 with probability 1/2. In contrast, with probability
(1−p), there is no information event and v takes a value of 50. This assumption
is meant to capture the idea that, during a day of trading, information may arrive
in the market and push the fundamental value of the asset up or down. In contrast,
inthecaseofnoevent,theassetvalueremainsatitsunconditionalexpectedvalue.
4. Other experimental studies on non-ﬁnancial herding and cascades, based on Bickchandani et al.
(1992), include Anderson and Holt (1997), Çelen and Kariv (2004), Goeree et al. (2007), Huck and
Oechssler (2000), and Kübler and Weiszäcker (2004).
5. The event is called “informational” because—as we shall see—when it occurs, some traders
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Themarket. Ateachtimet,atradercanexchangetheassetwithamarketmaker.
Thetradercanbuy,sell,ordecidenottotrade.Eachtradeconsistsoftheexchange
of one unit of the asset for cash. We denote the action of the trader at time t byxt
and denote the history of trades and prices up to time t − 1b yht.
The market maker. At any time t, the market maker sets the price at which a
trader can buy or sell the asset. He sets the price equal to the expected value
conditional on the public information available at time t, that is,6
pt = E(v | ht).
The traders. Traders are of two types, noise traders and informed traders. If the
value of the asset is 50 (i.e., there is no information event), there are only noise
tradersinthemarket.Noisetradersactfor“liquidity”orotherexogenousreasons,
buying,selling,ornottradingwithexogenouslygivenprobabilities.If,instead,an
information event occurs and the value of the asset is either 0 or 100, then at each
time t the trader acting in the market is an informed trader with probability µ and
anoisetraderwithprobability1−µ.Informedtradersreceiveprivateinformation
on the realization of the asset value. In particular, if at time t an informed trader
is chosen to trade, he observes a symmetric binary signal on the realization of v
with distribution
Pr(st = 100 | v = 100) = Pr(st = 0 | v = 0) = 0.7.
In addition to his signal, an informed trader at time t observes the history of
trades and prices and the current price. Therefore, his expected value of the asset





v − pt if xt = buy,
0i f xt = no trade,
pt − v if xt = sell.
Informed traders are risk neutral and choose xt to maximize E(U(v,xt,p t)|
ht,s t). Therefore, they ﬁnd it optimal to buy whenever E(v|ht,s t)>p t and sell
whenever E(v|ht,s t)<p t. They are indifferent among buying, no trading, and
selling when E(v | ht,s t) = pt.
6. In the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model the market maker posts a bid price and an ask
price and makes zero expected proﬁts because of unmodeled potential competition. In our model,
by setting one price only, the market maker earns negative expected proﬁts. This is not a problem
because in the experiment the market maker is not a subject, but an automaton.212 Journal of the European Economic Association
2.2. Theoretical Predictions
We now illustrate the predictions of our model by analyzing two distinct param-
eterizations, each corresponding to one of the two treatments that we ran in the
laboratory. In the ﬁrst parameterization, we set p = 1, that is, we assume that an
information event occurs with certainty. In this case we also assume that µ = 1,
that is, all traders in the market are informed. In the second parametrization, we
set p = 0.15 and µ = 0.95, that is, we assume that an information event occurs
with probability strictly smaller than 1, and that, if the event occurs, there is a
small proportion of noise traders in the market. Moreover, noise traders abstain
from trading with probability 0.33 during an informed day and with probability
0.02 during an uninformed day and, if they trade, they buy and sell with equal
probability.7
To discuss the theoretical predictions of the model, let us ﬁrst introduce the
formal deﬁnitions of cascade behavior, herd behavior, and contrarianism that we
will use in our analysis.
Definition 1. An informed trader engages in cascade behavior if he chooses
thesameactionindependentlyoftheprivatesignal.Ifthechosenactionconforms
to the majority of past trades the trader engages in herd behavior. If the chosen
action goes against the majority of past trades the trader engages in contrarian
behavior.
For instance, if a trader buys irrespective of whether he received a signal of
0 or 100, we say that he engages in cascade behavior. If the buy order follows a
history in which there are more buy than sell orders, the trader herds.8 If instead
the buy order follows a history with more sell than buy orders, the trader acts as
a contrarian.
Herdingandcontrarianismaretwoparticulartypesofcascadebehavior.Cas-
cade behavior, however, is a more general concept. For instance, a trader also
engages in cascade behavior if he abstains from trading for any realization of his
private signal. When describing the experimental results we will ﬁnd it useful
7. This parameterization, with a strictly positive proportion of noise traders and a different prob-
ability of no trade by noise traders when there is no information event, makes the implementation
of the model in the laboratory more natural. We will explain this in detail when we illustrate the
experimental procedures.
8. It is worth clarifying the relation between the standard deﬁnition of herd behavior in the social
learning literature and ours. In this literature (see, e.g., Gale 1996; Smith and Sörensen 2000), a
herd is said to occur when a sequence of agents make the same decision (not necessarily ignoring
their private information). Here, instead, we deﬁne herd behavior as a particular type of cascade
behavior. Our departure from the standard deﬁntion is motivated by the fact that our deﬁnition is
particularly convenient for the experimental analysis. In the analysis we elicit subjects’ strategies
conditionalonthesignalrealizations,whichismoreinformativethanonlyobservingtheactions.Our
deﬁnition of herding allows us to study when subjects ignore their private information to conform
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to distinguish between “cascade trading behavior” (when a trader engaging in
cascade behavior either buys or sells) and “cascade no-trading behavior” (when
he instead decides to abstain from trading).
Following Avery and Zemsky (1998), it is easy to show that, in the ﬁrst setup
(i.e., when an informational event occurs with probability one), cascade behavior
cannotarise;whereasinthesecondsetup(witheventuncertainty)cascadebehav-
ior (and, in particular, herd behavior) arises with positive probability. In contrast,
contrarianism and the other type of cascade behavior mentioned previously never
arise in equilibrium. We summarize this in the next two results.
Result 1. If an informational event occurs with certainty (p = 1), in equilib-
rium traders always trade according to their private signal and never engage in
cascade behavior.
To explain the result, let us recall that, in order to decide whether to buy or to
sell the asset, a trader computes its expected value and compares it to the price.
If at time t a trader receives a signal of 100, his expected value is
E(v | ht,s t = 100) = 100Pr(v = 100 | ht,s t = 100)
= 100
(0.7)Pr(v = 100 | ht)
(0.7)Pr(v = 100 | ht) + (0.3)(1 − Pr(v = 100 | ht))
> 100Pr(v = 100 | ht) = E(v | ht) = pt,
and,therefore,hebuys.Similarly,ifhereceivesasignalof0,hisexpectedvalueis
lower than the market price and he sells. This shows that an agent always ﬁnds it
optimaltotradeaccordingtohisprivateinformationandcascadebehaviorcannot
arise.
Let us turn now to the case in which p = 0.15, that is, in which there is
uncertainty about whether or not the value of the asset changed from its uncon-
ditional expectation. In such a case, it can be optimal for agents to neglect their
private information and herd.
Result 2. In the presence of event uncertainty (p<1), in equilibrium herd
behavior occurs with positive probability.




trader with probability 0.95. He will update his belief on the asset value on the
basis of this information. The market maker, by contrast, has a prior belief of214 Journal of the European Economic Association
Figure 1. Prices and traders’ expectations after a history of buys.
0.86 that a trade comes from a noise trader.9 Therefore, when he receives a buy
or a sell order, he updates his belief (i.e., the price) by less than the traders. As
a result, after a sequence of buy (sell) orders, the expectation of a trader may be
higher (lower) than the price even if he receives a bad (good) signal.
In Figure 1, we show the sequence of expectations and prices after a series
of buy orders. At time 3, the equilibrium price is lower than both the expectation
of a trader receiving a good signal and the expectation of a trader receiving a bad
signal.Therefore,thetraderattime3willbuyregardlessofthesignalhereceives,
that is, he will herd.
Note that, because the market maker updates his expectation (and the price)
by less than the informed traders, it will never be the case that, after a history of
buys,theexpectationofatraderwillbebelowthepriceforbothsignalrealizations.
Analogously, after a history of sell orders the expectation of an informed trader
will never be above the price for both signal realizations. As a result, an informed
trader will never engage in contrarian behavior.
Thepresenceofherdinginthemarketis,ofcourse,importantfortheinforma-
tional efﬁciency of prices. During periods of herd behavior, private information
is not efﬁciently aggregated by the price. In these periods, traders do not make
use of the private information they have and, as a result, the market cannot learn
such information.
Evenduringaperiodofherding,althoughthepricedoesnotaggregateprivate
information efﬁciently, the market maker does learn something on the true asset
value. Indeed, even in a period of herding, he updates his belief on whether
there has been an informational event.10 For this reason, in Figure 1 the price
keeps moving even after time 3, even though traders are herding. The market
9. The value 0.86 is equal to (1 − p)+ p(1 − µ).
10. Therefore, although in our model traders engage in herd behavior (and, hence, in cascade
behavior), a blockage of information never occurs. In the social learning literature, such a blockage
of information is called an informational cascade. In most setups, acting independently of the signal
(i.e., engaging in cascade behavior) implies a blockage of information. This, however, is not true in
our setup. For this reason, we prefer not to talk of informational cascades in the paper, and only use
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maker observes more and more traders buying the asset and gives more and more
weight to the event that these traders are informed (noise traders would buy or
sell with equal probabilities). Because of this price movement, herd behavior will
eventuallydisappear.AsshowninFigure1,duringaperiodofherdingthetraders’
expectations do not move (because the traders already know that an event has
occurred and they also know that informed traders are herding rather than using
their signals). When the price becomes higher than the expectation conditional
onabadsignal,agentswillnolongerﬁnditoptimaltoherd.Onthecontrary,they
will trade according to their private information. In our ﬁgure, this occurs at time
7. The model, therefore, explains temporary herd behavior. Clearly, Figure 1 is
justanexamplebecausetheoccurrenceandsubsequentbreakingofherdbehavior
depends on the speciﬁc sequence of trades.
3. The Experiment and the Experimental Design
3.1. The Experiment
We ran the experiment in the Experimental Laboratory of the ELSE Centre at the




The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The sessions started with written instructions given to all
subjects.12 We explained to the participants that they were all receiving the same
instructions. Subjects could ask clarifying questions, which we answered pri-
vately. The experiment consisted of two treatments. The ﬁrst treatment started
with two practice rounds, followed by seven rounds in which subjects received
monetary payments. After completing the ﬁrst treatment, participants received
the instructions for the second one. Then they took part in the second treatment,
which consisted again of seven paid rounds.13
Theparticipantsactedasinformedtradersandcouldexchangeanassetwitha
computerized market maker. In both treatments, we implemented our model con-
ditioning on an information event having occurred. The two treatments differed
with respect to the price-updating rule used by the market maker.
11. We also conducted a pilot session with eight more participants. In that session, we used a
different payoff function to pay the subjects. For this reason, we do not include the data from the
pilot session in the analysis of our results.
12. The instructions are available on the journal’s and on the authors’ Web pages:  http://www.
jeea.org ,  http://home.gwu.edu/∼mciprian ;  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/∼uctpagu .
13. The seven rounds of the second treatment were not preceded by practice rounds because the
two treatments were very similar.216 Journal of the European Economic Association
Let us now explain the procedures for each round of the experiment in detail.
1. At the beginning of each round, the computer program randomly chose the
asset value. The value was equal to 0 or 100 with probability 1/2. Each
random draw was independent.
2. Participants were not told the realization of the asset value. They knew, how-
ever, that they would receive information on the asset value in the form of
a symmetric binary signal. If the asset value was equal to 100, a partici-
pant would get a “white signal” with probability 0.7 and a “blue signal”
with probability 0.3. If the value was equal to 0, the probabilities would be
inverted.14
3. Each round consisted of 8 trading periods. In the ﬁrst trading period, all 8
subjects made two trading decisions, conditional on the two possible signal
realizations. They had to choose whether they would like to buy or sell one
unit of the asset (at the price of 50) or not to trade, both in the event of
receiving a white signal and in the event of receiving a blue signal. After
all eight participants made their decisions, the computer program randomly
selected one of them (with equal probability) as the actual trader for that
period. That subject received a signal (according to the rule indicated under
point 2) and his decision conditional on the signal was executed.
4. Theothersubjectsobservedontheirscreenstheexecutedtradingdecision,as
well as the new price for period 2. The identity of the subject whose decision
was executed, however, was not revealed.
5. In the second period, there were seven subjects whose decisions had not yet
been executed. As in the ﬁrst period, they indicated whether they wanted
to buy, sell, or not to trade conditional on the white and the blue signal.
Then, one of them was randomly selected, received a signal, and his decision
conditional on that signal was executed.
6. The same procedures were repeated for eight periods, until all subjects had
actedonce.Notethatallsubjects(includingthosewhosedecisionhadalready
been executed) observed the trading decisions in each period and the corre-
sponding price movement. Indeed, the computer program moved from one
period to another only after all eight participants had observed the history of
trades and prices, and had clicked on an “OK” button.
7. At the end of the round, after the decisions of all the eight subjects were exe-
cuted,therealizationoftheassetvaluewasrevealedandeachsubjectsawhis
own payoff for that round on the screen. The payoffs were computed as fol-
lows:ifhehadbought,thesubjectobtainedv−pt ofaﬁctitiousexperimental
currency called “lira”; if he had sold, he obtained pt − v lire; ﬁnally, if he
had decided not to trade, he earned (and lost) nothing. After participants had
14. That is, the white signal corresponded to st = 100 and the blue signal to st = 0.Cipriani and Guarino Herd Behavior: An Experiment with Financial Professionals 217
observed their payoffs and clicked on an “OK” button, the software moved
to the next round.
As should be clear from this description, compared to the existing experi-
mentalliteratureoninformationalcascades,weintroducedtheproceduralnovelty
of a strategy-like method. This has the advantage that we could detect cascade
behavior directly. A subject engages in cascade behavior when he makes the
same decision independently of his signal realization. Because in our experiment
a subject made a decision for each possible signal realization, we could directly
observe whether he chose the same action for both signal realizations.15 Fur-
thermore, with this method, we collect much more information on the subjects’
decision process than with the traditional procedures used in informational cas-
cades experiments (in which a subject is ﬁrst chosen to trade, then receives a
signal and ﬁnally makes a decision). Indeed, in each treatment, we observed on
average 36 decisions per subject, instead of just 7 (one per round). At the same
time, our procedure was easy to implement and was quite natural for ﬁnancial
market professionals, because they are used to the idea of a conditional market
order that is not necessarily executed.16
At the end of the experiment, we summed up the per-round payoffs of both
treatmentsandconvertedthemintopoundsattherateof3lireperpound.Withthis
exchangeratetheincentiveswereclearlymuchstrongerthaninmostexperiments.
In addition, we gave subjects £70 just for participating in the experiment.17 On
average, subjects earned £134 (approximately equal to £263 and 196 at the time
of the experiment) for a 2.5-hour experiment. The minimum payment amounted
to $38 while the maximum was £268, with a standard deviation equal to £44.18
Finally,beforeleaving,subjectsﬁlledoutashortquestionnaire,inwhichthey
reportedsomepersonalcharacteristics(gender,age,education,workposition,job
tenure) and described their strategy and their beliefs on other subjects’ strategy
15. In the existing experimental literature, instead, cascade behavior is typically detected by focus-
ing on the decisions of subjects when they receive a signal against the history of trades. The reason
is that, in almost all the existing experiments, subjects ﬁrst receive the signal and then are asked
to make a decision. An important exception is Çelen and Kariv (2004), who employ continuous
action and signal spaces to distinguish informational cascades from herd behavior in a non-market
experiment.
16. Note that the procedure that we employ is not identical to the strategy method. With a strategy
method, we should have asked each participant to make a decision for each possible contingency.
Because there is a very large number of histories of trades, this would have been impossible to
implement. In contrast, our method allowed us to collect a large dataset while keeping the process
of trading simple.
17. The ﬁxed payment was given to make sure that participants did not end up with losses.
18. We could have used the lottery method to pay our subjects in order to try to control for risk
preferences. Because previous experimental work by Drehman et al. (2005) has found that using
the lottery method does not produce signiﬁcantly different results in this type of experiment, we
preferred to use the more natural and simple way of computing payoffs.218 Journal of the European Economic Association
in the experiment. Immediately after completing the questionnaire, subjects were
paid in private and could leave the laboratory.19
3.2. Experimental Design: The Two Treatments
As we mentioned before, the difference between the two treatments is in the
price-updating rule. In Treatment I, we implemented the model without event
uncertainty described in Section 2 (i.e., the parameterization with p = 1 and
µ = 1). In Treatment II, we implemented instead the model with uncertainty
about the informational event (i.e., with p = 0.55 and µ = 0.95).
In Treatment I there is always an information event; whereas in Treatment
II an information event occurs with probability 0.15. Nevertheless, in Treat-
ment II we ran the experiment assuming that an information event had occurred.
Therefore, from the participants’ viewpoint, the main difference between the two
treatments was how the price was updated for a given order ﬂow.
Letusillustratehowweupdatetheprice.Asexplainedintheprevioussection,
the market maker sets only one price.20 According to the theory, in Treatment I
in equilibrium subjects should always follow their signal, that is, they should buy
afterseeingawhitesignalandsellafterseeingablueone.Nooneshoulddecidenot
to trade, as private information allows the traders to make proﬁts by trading with
the market maker. Therefore, when a subject decides to buy, the price is updated
assuming that he has seen a good signal. Similarly, when a subject decides to sell,
the price is updated assuming that the subject has observed a bad signal. Finally,
in the case of a no trade, the price is kept constant. As a result, in this treatment,
the price moves through a grid. It starts at time 1 at the unconditional expected
value of 50. After a sequence of buys, it moves, according to Bayesian updating,
through a sequence of values 70, 84, 93, 97, 99, …. Similarly, after a sequence
of sell orders, it moves through a sequence of values 30, 16, 7, 3, 1, …. The price
at each time t only depends on the trade imbalance, that is, on the difference
between the number of buy and sell orders observed up until the previous period
t − 1.
In Treatment II, we change the price updating rule, following the theoretical
model with event uncertainty. We implement the treatment in the laboratory by
19. In designing the experiment and the questionnaire we made sure to maintain subjects’
anonymity. In particular, we made clear that the procedures were such that we would not be able to
link each individual performance to a name or to a subject’s institution. Moreover, in the experiment
it was impossible to know the identity of other subjects in the sequence.
20. Allowing the market maker to set only one price makes the experiment easier to run. In their
experiment with student subjects, Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) compare the results of a treatment
with only one price set by an automaton (as in this paper) and a treatment where subjects acting as
market makers were allowed to post bid and ask prices. They ﬁnd that the results are not affected by
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explaining to the subjects that, in the second part of the experiment, the market
maker will update the price as if, with high probability, it were trading not with
informed traders, but with noise traders.21 As in the previous treatment, partic-
ipants can observe the amount by which the computer updated the price before
theymadetheirdecisions.Therefore,theyhavealltheinformationneededtomax-
imize their payoffs. Figures 1 and 2 show the price movement after a sequence
of eight buy and eight sell orders. We have already commented on Figure 1 in
the previous section. Let us focus on Figure 2 here. After the sell orders the price
decreases, but by less than in Treatment I. As a result, subjects should follow the
signalintheﬁrsttwoperiodsbutthentheyshouldsellindependentlyofthesignal
(herding on the previous actions) in periods 3 to 6. At time 7 the price is low
enough that subjects should now sell only conditional on a blue signal (and buy
conditionalonawhiteone).Figure3offersanotherexampleofthepricechanges,
following a sale at time 1 and a series of buy orders later on. In this case subjects
should herd only starting at time 5, whereas they should follow their signals in
the ﬁrst 4 times. Note, that, as in Treatment I, the price is updated assuming that
traders choose the optimal action, that is, they follow their private information
when their expectation conditional on a white (blue) signal is above (below) the
market price, and they buy (sell) irrespective of their signal when we are in a herd
buy (herd sell) period.
3.3. The Pool of Participants
The study was conducted with 32 ﬁnancial professionals employed in 13 dif-
ferent ﬁnancial institutions, all operating in London. Out of the 32 participants,
28% were traders, 47% market analysts, 9% sale or investment management
persons, 9% investment bankers, and 6% managers.22 Eighty-four percent of
21. Anotherdifferencebetweentheparameterizationoftheﬁrstandthesecondtreatmentisthat,in
thesecondtreatment,therewere5%ofnoisetraders.Weimplementedthisinthelaboratorybyhaving
a3 .3% probability in each trading period of a wrongly executed trading order (e.g., with a 3.3%
probabilityasaleoranotradewasexecuted,althoughthetrueordercomingfromtheparticipantwas
a buy). This is equivalent to saying that there was a 5% probability that in each period the trade was
coming from a “noise trader.” The presence of noise traders in the second treatment was necessary
for the following reason. Suppose that at time t a rational subject should always buy (because we are
inaherdbuyperiod).Ifthesubjectchosentotradedecidestosell,intheabsenceofnoisetraders,the
marketmakerwouldinferthatthemarketisuninformed,thatis,thatalltradersarenoisetraders.The
market maker would, therefore, set the price equal to 50 for the entire round. Having a proportion of
noisetraderswhenthereisaninformationeventpreventsthisfromhappening.Alsorecallthat,inthe
parameterizationofthesecondtreatment,theprobabilityofanoisetraderdecidingnottotradediffers
according to whether an information event has occurred or not (33% and 2%, respectively). This is
tantamount to imposing that no trades do not convey information on the likelihood of an information
event to the market maker and, as a result, the Bayesian updating rule implies no change in the price
after a no trade (as also happens in the ﬁrst treatment), which is a natural and desirable feature.
22. We use “investment banking” in its stricter meaning, as one of ﬁnancial institutions’ core
functions. Moreover, “analyst” refers to the function within the institution and not to the rank.220 Journal of the European Economic Association
Figure 2. Prices and traders’ expectations after a history of sells.
Figure 3. Prices and traders’ expectations after a sell followed by a history of buys.
subjects were men and 16% women. The participants’ ages ranged between 21
and 40 years, with a mean equal to 28 years and a standard deviation equal to
4.9 years. The average job tenure was 4 years, with a range between 3 months
and 16 years (standard deviation: 4.2 years). Finally, 8% of participants had
a Ph.D., 61% an M.A./M.S., and 31% a B.A./B.S. Most participants (68%)
with a B.A./B.S. degree had studied economics/ﬁnance/business; by contrast, the
Masters degrees were split almost equally between economics/ﬁnance/business
and scientiﬁc or technical disciplines such as physics, mathematics, or
engineering; ﬁnally, the Ph.D. degrees were in physics or computer
science.
4. Results: Rationality, Herding, and Contrarian Behavior
We now turn to a discussion of the results of the experiment. For expositional
reasons, we ﬁnd it convenient to present ﬁrst the results of Treatment I and then
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Table 1. Average behavior in Treatment I.
Decision (%)
Following private information 45.7






Table 1 breaks down the participants’ decisions in Treatment I according to how
they used their own private information. In 45.7% of the cases, subjects just
followed their private signal, buying on a white signal, and selling on a blue one.
Recall that this is the rational behavior that theory predicts in equilibrium.23 In
19.6% of the cases, instead, they followed one of the two signals, but preferred to
abstain from trading conditional on the other. In 19% of the cases, they decided
to disregard private information and buy or sell conditional on both signals—
that is, they engaged in cascade trading behavior. In 12.3% of the cases, subjects
preferred not to trade independently of their private information—that is, they
engaged in cascade no-trading behavior. Finally, there are a few cases (3.4%)
in which subjects made decisions that are self-contradictory for any possible
belief.24
This aggregate behavior clearly shows that, although the theory captures
some of the trading rules that subjects used in the laboratory, there are some
departures from the equilibrium predictions that must be explained.25 First, we
must understand why subjects sometimes decided to engage in cascade behavior
andtradeindependentlyofthesignal.Onepossibilityisthatasubjectmayneglect
privateinformationtoherd.AswementionedinSection2,accordingtothetheory,
herding should not occur in this treatment. Subjects in the laboratory, however,
23. Following one’s private information is rational only if each subject believes that all his pre-
decessors are rational, that all his predecessors believe that their predecessors are rational, and so
on. Furthermore, after a no-trade decision, which is always off the equilibrium path, subjects should
not update their beliefs (which is consistent with our price updating rule), should believe that their
predecessors did not update their beliefs, and so on.
24. For instance, we observed some decisions to sell conditional on a white signal, but not to trade
conditionalonabluesignal,whichcanonlybeinterpretedasamistakebecauseawhitesignalalways
conveys more positive information about the asset value than a blue one.
25. Note that the results in Table 1 overweigh decisions taken in the ﬁrst periods (when all subjects
take a decision) with respect to those taken at later periods (when fewer subjects do so). This implies
that the results overweigh decisions taken when the trade imbalance is 0 with respect to those taken
when the trade imbalance is high. In the following analysis, we will control for this, by studying the
decisions taken conditional on a given level of the trade imbalance.222 Journal of the European Economic Association
Table 2. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment I.
Cascade Herd Contrarian
Absolute value trading behavior behavior
of the trade imbalance (%) (%) (%)
0 5.8
1 18.5 5.7 12.9
2 42.7 16.1 26.6
3 54.3 23.9 30.4
≥ 4 62.5 21.9 40.6
may give more weight to public information (i.e., the history of trades) than our
price updating rule does, and believe that conditioning the trade on the private
signal is not optimal when the order ﬂow already shows evidence in favor of the
asset value being high or low. A second possibility is that a subject may decide
to act as a “contrarian” by going against the market. This behavior should not
occur in equilibrium either, but a subject may use the strategy of going against
the market to sell at a high price and buy at a low one.
Table2showshowcascadetradingbehaviorevolvedaccordingtotheabsolute
value of the trade imbalance, that is, the absolute value of the difference in the
number of buy and sell orders. There is a monotonic increase in the proportion
of cascade-trading decisions as the trade imbalance increases: When the trade
imbalance is 0, cascade trading behavior accounts for less than 6% of decisions,
whereas, for an absolute value of the trade imbalance of 3 or more, it accounts
for more than 50% of decisions.
Notethat,whenthetradeimbalanceis0,wecannotclassifycascadebehavior
as herding or contrarianism. In such a case the number of buy and sell orders
is identical, and the price is equal to the unconditional expected value of 50.
Therefore,thesubjects’decisionstobuyorsellindependentlyofthesignalcannot
beexplainedeitherintermsoffollowingthecrowdorgoingagainstit.Bycontrast,
when the absolute value of the trade imbalance is at least 1 we can distinguish
between herd and contrarian behavior as explained in Section 2.
As Table 2 shows, the evolution of herding and contrarianism with the trade
imbalance is quite different. When the absolute value of the trade imbalance
increases, so does the evidence in favor of the asset value being 0 or 100. This
couldhaveinducedsubjectstofollowmoreandmorethepredecessors’decisions.
As a matter of fact, herding almost triples when the imbalance goes from 1 to
2, but then it stabilizes at a level close to 20%. Contrarianism, instead, increases
monotonicallyandbyasubstantialamountwiththetradeimbalanceandaccounts
for a large percentage (40%) of all decisions when the trade imbalance is high (at
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subjects do not have a strong tendency to herd. In contrast, they do have a strong
tendency to behave as contrarians.26
One could wonder whether the observed deviations from the theory can be
explained by the fact that a subject deciding in later periods may factor in the
possibilityoferrorsbytheirpredecessors.Inthiscase,hisoptimaltradingdecision
may change. As is now standard in the experimental literature, we answered this
question through an analysis of errors. We estimated the error rates assuming
that expected payoffs are subject to shocks distributed independently as a logistic
randomvariable(seeMcKelveyandPalfrey1995).Ateachtimet,theprobability
of an action is a function of the difference between the expected payoff of buying









where j = 0,1,2 indicates a no trade, a buy, or a sell order, respectively.27
The model implies that a subject may not choose the action that yields the
highestpayoff,thatis,thathemaymakeamistake.Foreachperiodoftrading,we
estimated the parameters of the model by regressing all trading decisions up to
that period across subjects and rounds on  t. The analysis was recursive, that is,
we used the estimated parameters γ 1
j ,...,γt−1
j to compute the expected payoffs
at time t. In other words, when computing a subject’s expected payoff at time t,
we assume that the subject incorporates in his expectations the likelihood that his
predecessors have made mistakes.
By using this model, we can explain a proportion of contrarianism. In par-
ticular, when the absolute trade imbalance is equal to or higher than 4, all the
contrarianismthatweﬁndinthedatacanbeconsideredrational.28 Contrarianism
at lower levels of the absolute trade imbalance, however, remains a non-rational
behavior even if one takes into account previous subjects’ mistakes.29
We will discuss individual behavior in detail in Section 5. Here, however, it
is worth noting that there was signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the decision to herd,
26. Ourresultsonherdingandcontrarianismarefurtherconﬁrmedwhenonelooksatthedecisions
to follow one of the two signals only (and not to trade conditional on the other). The ﬁgure reported
in Table 1 (19.6%) results from two different types of behavior: the decision to follow the signal that
agrees with the trade imbalance (e.g., the white signal after more buys than sells) and not to trade
conditional on the signal at odds with it; and the decision to follow the signal that is at odds with the
trade imbalance (e.g., the blue signal after more buys than sells) and not to trade conditional on the
one that agrees with it. Interestingly, this latter type of behavior is more frequent (11.5%) than the




prices are set taking into account subjects’ actual trading decisions.
29. Similarly, the modest proportion of herding remains non-national rational even taking into
account the errors in the laboratory.224 Journal of the European Economic Association
Table 3. No trade in Treatment I.
Cascade
Absolute value no-trading






with the vast majority of subjects never herding. As a matter of fact, 24 out
of the overall 39 decisions to herd for an absolute trade imbalance of at least 2
(i.e.,62%ofthesedecisions)areduetotwosubjectsonly.Ifweexcludethesetwo
subjects,thepercentageofherdingbecomesverylow(only8%ofdecisionstaken
for an absolute trade imbalance of at least 2). The results also show signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in the degree of contrarianism, with slightly more than half of the
subjects never acting as contrarians. In contrast to herding, however, the overall
proportion of contrarian decisions is not affected by the behavior of only few
subjects.
Now, let us look at the decision of subjects not to participate in the market,
that is, the decision not to trade independently of the signal (cascade no-trading).
Cascadeno-tradingoccurredmainlyundertwocircumstances:whenthetrade
imbalancewas0andwhenitwashigh(greaterthanorequalto3)(seeTable3).A
trade imbalance of 0 means that either no one has yet traded in the market or that
the order ﬂow has not taken any particular direction. In such circumstances, sub-
jects have sometimes used the strategy of not taking a trading position, opting for
trading only when the market has already taken a direction. For strictly positive
levels of the absolute trade imbalance, the level of no trade is then monotoni-
cally increasing. It is worth recalling that a higher level of the trade imbalance is
equivalent to a price farther away from the unconditional expected value. There-
fore, a higher trade imbalance also meant that the possible loss (i.e., buying when
the fundamental was 0 or selling when it was 100) was higher. The higher this
potential loss, the lower was the participation in the market.
4.2. Treatment II
Let us now analyze subjects’ decisions in Treatment II. Recall that the theoretical
predictionsforthistreatmentaredifferentfromthoseofTreatmentI.Inparticular,
in Treatment II, it is no longer the case that subjects should always follow their
private information. After a given history of trades, it is possible that the optimal
decision for a rational trader is to buy irrespective of the signal (herd buy periods)Cipriani and Guarino Herd Behavior: An Experiment with Financial Professionals 225
Table 4. Average behavior in Treatment II.
Decision (%)
Following private information 50.9





Table 5. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment II.
Cascade Herd Contrarian
Absolute value trading behavior behavior
of the trade imbalance (%) (%) (%)
0 2.2
1 8.2 4.4 3.8
2 23.0 18.4 4.6
3 34.3 30.3 4.0
≥ 4 40.4 40.4 0.0
or to sell irrespective of the signal (herd sell periods). Table 4 breaks down the
participants’ decisions in Treatment II according to how they used their own
private information. In 51% of the cases, subjects followed their private signal,
buying on a white signal, and selling on a blue one. Although in Treatment I the
proportionofdecisionsinaccordancewithprivateinformationisalsoameasureof
how the participants’ strategies agreed with the theoretical predictions, this is no
longer the case in Treatment II. For this reason, we also computed the percentage
oftimesinwhichtheparticipants’strategiesagreedwiththetheoreticalprediction,
which was 48%, almost identical to that of Treatment I.30 As for the other ﬁgures
reported in Table 4, it is worth noting that there is slightly less cascade trading
behavior than what was reported in Table 1 and slightly more cascade no-trading
behavior. The strategy of following one of the two signals and not trading on the
other was chosen almost the same percentage of times as in Treatment I.
The difference between the behavior in the two treatments becomes striking
when one contrasts Table 5 with Table 2. In contrast with the previous treatment,
contrarianism is now very modest. It does not increase at all with the trade imbal-
ance and remains always at an almost negligible level. On the other hand, herd
behavior is steadily increasing with the trade imbalance. For a trade imbalance of
at least 4, herd behavior explains all cascade trading behavior; it amounts to 40%
30. In other words, this is the percentage of the time in which subjects followed the signals when
theory prescribes to follow the signal and herded when the theory prescribes to do so. Of course, the
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of all decisions taken for such levels of the imbalance. The different propensity
to herd with respect to Treatment I can easily be appreciated by noting that in that
treatment, even for the highest levels of the trade imbalance, herd behavior was
around 20%, a relatively low increment from the 5.8% of cascade behavior when
thetradeimbalancewas0.Inthepresenttreatment,bycontrast,cascadebehavior
is only 2.2% for a trade imbalance of 0 but jumps to 40.4% (all due to herding)
for a trade imbalance higher than 3. Therefore, we can conclude that the theory
correctly predicts the higher level of herding in this treatment with respect to the
previous one.31
The level of herding observed in the laboratory, however, is lower than what
the theory predicts. We computed the percentage of herd behavior in the periods
in which herding is theoretically rational.32 The result is that herding occurred
in only 23% of these periods.33 Because this type of ﬁnancial market has never
beentestedpreviouslyinthelaboratory,wecannotcompareourresultstothoseof
other studies, not even to experiments conducted with students. The closest study
is the “ﬁxed price treatment” presented in Cipriani and Guarino (2005a). In that
treatment, subjects (undergraduate students) had three options, as in the present
context,andthepricewasalwayssetequaltotheunconditionalexpectedvalueof
50. Subjects engaged in herd behavior 50% of the time. The difference may well
beduetothefactthatherethereispricemovement,althoughitislesspronounced
than in the previous treatment; this may have induced subjects to disregard the
previous history of trades even in cases where doing so was not optimal. Our
low level of herding, however, is also reminiscent of the results by Alevy et al.
(2007), according to whom ﬁnancial professionals put more weight on private
information than students do and are less inclined to follow predecessors.34
In summary, we can draw two conclusions on herding and contrarianism.
First, whereas in Treatment I we observe a signiﬁcant deviation from the theory
because of contrarian behavior, this does not happen in Treatment II, where, as
thetheorypredicts,contrarianismisnotpresent.Second,thecomparisonbetween
31. Another signiﬁcant difference with respect to Treatment I is that here, when participants fol-
lowedonlyonesignalanddidnottradeconditionalontheother,theymainlyfollowedthesignalthat
agreed with the trade imbalance. In fact, this behavior accounts for 16.9% of subjects’ decisions,
out of the 19.6% of cases in which subjects followed only one signal (and decided not to trade for
the other). This contrasts with what was observed in footnote 26 for Treatment I, namely, that when
agents decided to follow only one signal, they mainly did so for the signal that did not agree with
the trade imbalance.
32. The same remark as in the ﬁrst part of footnote 23 applies to this computation, too.
33. Note, however, that if we take into account previous subjects’ mistakes through an analysis of
errors, the proportion of decisions in which traders correctly decided to herd increases to 31%.
34. As we have mentioned, Treatment II, in which the theory predicts herding because of event
uncertainty, has never been run with student subjects. Nevertheless, given the difference in behavior
between students and ﬁnancial market professionals (see Section 5), one can speculate that, had we
run the experiment with students, we might have observed a higher incidence of herd behavior, thus
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Table 6. No trade in Treatment II.
Cascade
Absolute value no-trading






the experimental results in the two treatments supports the theoretical prediction
that informational uncertainty is a source of herding behavior. In particular, in
Treatment II, herd behavior occurs, especially for high values of the trade imbal-
ance, and occurs more often than what we observe in Treatment I. The level of
herding observed in Treatment II, however, is lower than what theory predicts.
Another signiﬁcant difference between the two treatments emerges when we
look at the decisions not to trade. As Table 6 shows, in Treatment II, cascade
no-tradingismonotonicallyandsharplydecreasingwiththeabsolutevalueofthe
trade imbalance. Subjects decided not to participate in the market mainly for a
trade imbalance of 0. To explain such a behavior it is worth recalling that in this
treatment, even for a high level of the trade imbalance, the price never reached
values close to the extremes (0 or 100) and, as a result, the maximum loss was
never very high. A high trade imbalance revealed information on the asset value,
without making the maximum loss too high. For a high value of the imbalance,
when subjects wanted to use the option of not trading, they typically preferred to
do so conditional on one signal only (the signal at odds with the trade imbalance)
than to do so conditional on both.
5. Comparison with Previous Experimental Results
As we mentioned in the Introduction, Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) and
Drehmann et al. (2005) have run experiments similar to our Treatment I with
a different pool of subjects. It is useful to compare their results to ours.
Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) and Drehmann et al. (2005) reach similar con-
clusions: subjects have a modest propensity to herd, whereas, at the same time,
there are deviations from the equilibrium predictions in terms of abstention from
trading and of contrarian behavior. Our ﬁrst treatment is very similar to Cipri-
ani and Guarino’s (2005a) “Flexible Price Treatment” (CG-FPT from now on)
because the parameter values chosen to implement the experiment are the same.
Thismakesthecomparisonwiththatstudyparticularlyeasy.Themaindifference
betweenTreatmentIandCG-FPTisthat,whereasweusedastrategy-likemethod,228 Journal of the European Economic Association
in CG-FPT each subject made only one decision per round, after observing the
signal realization.35 Therefore, comparing the statistics we have reported in the
previous section with those reported in CG-FPT would not be correct.36 In order
to compare our experimental results with those of CG-FPT, we computed the
same statistics as CG-FPT using our data set (e.g., we computed the proportion
ofrationaldecisionsonlyconsideringthosedecisionsthatwereactuallyexecuted,
which is what we would have observed had we used the same procedures of that
study).
In CG-FPT, the proportion of decisions that were rational (i.e., consistent
with the theory) was 65%.37 This is the same percentage that we obtain in our
study.Theaverageproportionofnotradeswas22%inCG-FPTandis24%inour
experiment.CiprianiandGuarino(2005a)studiedherdbehaviorbyanalyzingthe
subjects’ decisions when they faced a trade imbalance of at least two (in absolute
value) and received a signal against the imbalance. In CG-FPT subjects decided
to neglect their private information and engage in herd behavior in 12% of the
cases; in 42% of the cases they decided not to trade and in 46% they followed
theirsignal.Thecorrespondingnumbersinourstudyare5%forherding,32%for
no trade, and 63% for following the signal. Finally, contrarianism was studied in
Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) by analyzing the case in which a subject observed
a bad signal and a trade imbalance lower than or equal to −2 or a good signal and
a trade imbalance greater than or equal to 2. Using this criterion, we observed
28% of contrarianism versus 19% in CG-FPT.
It is clear from these numbers that the behavior of ﬁnancial market profes-
sionals is not very dissimilar from that of the undergraduate students used in
Cipriani and Guarino (2005a). The similarity of results is reassuring for pre-
vious experimental ﬁndings.38 Our study conﬁrms the low propensity to herd,
and it shows an even more pronounced propensity to go against the market by
ﬁnancial professionals. Interestingly, it also shows that abstention from trading
35. Moreover, CG-FPT was run with paper and pencil and involved 12 subjects instead of 8.
Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) also ran other treatments with slightly different procedures and found
that their results are robust to these variations. Overall, their results are based on the observation of
192 subjects.
36. Indeed,thedifferencesinproceduresimplythateventhedeﬁnitionsofrationality,herding,and
contrarianism are different. For instance, we classiﬁed an action as rational when the subject made
the correct decision (according to theory) conditional on both signals. In CG-FPT, instead, because
subjects made a decision after observing the signal, rationality meant that the decision taken was
correct given the observed signal. Clearly, the deﬁnition of rationality in this paper is stricter than
that in CG-FPT.
37. For a structural approach to the analysis of rationality in the laboratory see also Cipriani and
Guarino (2005b).
38. As we have mentioned, in contrast to CG-FPT, our experiment was run with a strategy-like
method. The similarity between the results seems to suggest that using the strategy-like method per
se does not induce a different behavior. In the experimental literature, other papers have reached the
same conclusion (e.g., Brandts and Charness 2000; Oxoby and McLeish 2004), although there is no
consensus on the issue (e.g., Güth, Huck, and Müller 2001; Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2003).Cipriani and Guarino Herd Behavior: An Experiment with Financial Professionals 229
Table 7. Percentage of decisions in accordance with the theoretical predictions at individual
level.
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
decisions in accordance participants participants
with the theoretical predictions Treatment I Treatment II
0–20 18.72 5 .0
21–40 21.91 2 .5
41–60 31.31 8 .8





In the previous section we characterized the aggregate choices of all the partic-
ipants in the experiment. We now turn to discuss the degree of heterogeneity in
individual behavior and its sources. Table 7 classiﬁes individuals depending on
the percentage of the time in which their decisions agreed with those predicted
by the theory.
The table clearly shows that in both treatments participants behaved quite
differently. For instance, in both treatments there are almost 10% of subjects
who made the theoretically optimal decision more than 80% of the time; on the
other hand, there are approximately 20% of subjects who made the theoretically
optimal decision less than 20% of the time. It is worth studying whether such
heterogenous behavior can be related to the participants’ characteristics.
At the end of the experiment we collected information on the participants’
age, gender, education, job tenure, and job position. Table 8 shows the results
of regressing the proportion of decisions taken in accordance with theory for
each participant against the participants’ age, education, gender, and a dummy
for traders.39 Only the participants’ age has a statistically signiﬁcant and positive
effect. The subjects’ level of education, gender, and being an actual trader are not
signiﬁcant determinants of the level of rationality.40
39. The variable education takes value 1 if the participant’s highest degree of education is a
B.A./B.S., 2 for an M.A./M.S., and 3 for a Ph.D. The dummy variable for trader takes value 1
if the participant is a trader and 0 otherwise.
40. We also used the job tenure as a regressor instead of age, and obtained similar results. Unfor-
tunately, our data set does not allow us to disentangle which of these two (collinear) variables has an
effect on rationality. If we include both age and job tenure as regressors, both coefﬁcients become
non-signiﬁcant.230 Journal of the European Economic Association
Table 8. Regressionsofthelevelofrationalityintheexperimentonindividualcharacteristics.









Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.00 0.09 0.129 0.053 0.279
p-values are in parentheses.
Participants showed heterogeneity also in the speciﬁc trading strategies dis-
cussed in the previous sections (i.e., propensity to herd and act as contrarians).
For instance, as already mentioned before, in Treatment I only very few subjects
engaged often in herd behavior, whereas many never did.41 Through regression
analysis, we have studied whether the participants’ propensity to herd or act as a
contrarianisaffectedbytheirpersonalcharacteristics.Noneofthecharacteristics
that we analyzed had a signiﬁcant impact, except gender: Women made signiﬁ-
cantly fewer contrarian decisions in the ﬁrst treatment and more herd decisions
in the second treatment.42
Table 9 shows the relationship between a subject’s payoff and his personal
characteristics. Traders earned signiﬁcantly more than the other participants. No
othercharacteristicssigniﬁcantlyaffectedthesubjects’payoffs.Thesigniﬁcantly
higher payoff of traders was due to higher earnings in Treatment I, whereas no
signiﬁcant difference emerged in Treatment II.43 It is, however, difﬁcult to gauge
from the data how traders achieved higher payoffs. Indeed, as Table 10 shows,
being a professional trader did not change the tendency to act as a herder, or
as a contrarian, or to abstain from trading or to behave rationally. It appears that
professionaltradershadanabilitytoearnmoremoneythantheotherparticipants,
even though, with respect to herding, contrarianism, and no trading, their trading
strategies do not look different.
41. For an absolute trade imbalance of at least 2, 66% of participants never herded.
42. In the interest of space, we do not report the regression results, because most of the coefﬁcients
are not signiﬁcant.
43. Thep-valuesoftheper-treatmentregressions(which,intheinterestofspace,wedonotreport)
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Table 9. Regression of subjects’ payoff at the end of the experiment on individual character-
istics.









Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.00 0.02 0.001 0.054 0.080
p-values are in parentheses.
Table 10. Regressions of participants’ proportion of herding, contrarianism, and no-trading
on the trader’s dummy. Herd 1 and Contrarian 1 refer to Treatment I.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Herd 1 Herd 2 Contr 1 Contr 2 No Trade
Trader 0.292 0.268 0.131 0.026 0.018
(0.204) (0.206) (0.199) (0.744) (0.855)
Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.147 0.121 0.021 0.007 0.002
Herd 2 and Contrarian 2 refer to Treatment II. p-values are in parentheses.
7. Conclusions
Inthispaperwehaveanalyzedcascadeandherdbehaviorinalaboratoryﬁnancial
market. The main novelty of our experiment is the use of a sample of ﬁnancial
marketprofessionalsinsteadofcollegeundergraduates.Moreover,withrespectto
the existing literature, we have introduced a new experimental design, akin to the
strategy method. In the experiment, subjects make conditional orders, contingent
on any signal realization, instead of choosing an action after observing a realiza-
tion. With this method we are able to elicit beliefs and detect cascade behavior
directly (whereas in previous experiments it could only be inferred indirectly).
Wehaveruntwotreatments.InTreatmentI,thepriceadjuststotheorderﬂow
in such a way that subjects should simply follow their own private information.
In Treatment II, where the price adjustment rule is consistent with the presence
of event uncertainty, it is sometimes rational for subjects to neglect their private
information and imitate the predecessors. This is the ﬁrst study where herding in
ﬁnancial markets with event uncertainty is tested in the laboratory.
In the ﬁrst treatment, with no event uncertainty, agents rarely herded, which
is consistent with the theory. At the same time, two anomalies emerged. First,
subjects had a tendency to go against the market (contrarian behavior). Second,232 Journal of the European Economic Association
they sometimes preferred to abstain from trading although they had an informa-
tional advantage over the market maker. The results of this ﬁrst treatment are in
line with previous experimental evidence on student subjects.
Inthesecondtreatment,witheventuncertainty,theproportionofherdbehav-
ior increased with respect to the ﬁrst treatment, as predicted by the theory. At the
same time, such a proportion was lower than the equilibrium prediction. Contrar-
ian behavior disappeared altogether in this treatment, whereas the decision not to
trade was observed often, as in the case of no event uncertainty.
Our study combines the advantage of the controlled experiment with that of
observingthebehaviorofprofessionals,whoareengagedintheday-by-dayactiv-
ityoftrading,pricing,andanalyzingﬁnancialassets.Webelievethatthechallenge
for future research is twofold. On the one hand, the existing experimental results
offer suggestions for research with ﬁeld data, which should study whether the
behaviors observed in the laboratory are present in actual ﬁnancial markets. On
the other hand, more theoretical work is needed to capture the behavior that the
present model is unable to predict, such as contrarianism and abstention from
trading activity.
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